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A B S T R A C T
The mentalizing system and mirror system are thought to play important roles in inferring the internal mental
states of others – a process known as mentalizing. Autism spectrum condition (ASC) is associated with diﬃculties
in mentalizing. The aim of this study was to determine whether the behavioural diﬃculties in mentalizing
associated with ASC can be explained by changes in functional connectivity between the mentalizing and mirror
system. We recruited 40 adult participants (20 with ASC and 20 typically-developing). Brain activity was
monitored using functional magnetic resonance imaging while participants watched videos in which actors
performed hand actions. The videos were shown in separate mentalizing and non-mentalizing blocks. During
mentalizing blocks, participants were asked to indicate whether hand actions were clumsy or spiteful (i.e. to
judge the intent of the action). During non-mentalizing blocks, participants indicated whether the actions were
successful or unsuccessful (i.e. to judge the outcome of the action). Higher activity during the mentalizing blocks
compared to non-mentalizing blocks was found in regions associated with the mentalizing system: the dorsal
medial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), as well as in regions typically as-
sociated with the mirror system: the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and the inferior parietal lobe (IPL). Next,
functional connectivity between regions was evaluated as a function of task. During mentalizing blocks, there
was increased functional connectivity between the dmPFC and the mirror system in typically developing par-
ticipants. In contrast, there was no increase in functional connectivity between these regions in ASC participants.
Connectivity between the dmPFC and IFG was negatively correlated with autistic traits. The reduced con-
nectivity in ASC participants was consistent with behavioural performance on the mentalizing task, which was
also negatively correlated with the level of autistic traits. Together, these data emphasise the importance of
functional connectivity between the mentalizing and mirror systems when inferring social intentions and show
that reduced connectivity between these systems may explain some of the behavioural diﬃculties experienced
by adults with ASC.
1. Introduction
Inferring the internal mental states of others is critical for successful
social interactions and is known as mentalizing (Chung et al., 2014;
Frith and Frith, 2006). The actions of other individuals provide an
important source of this social information (Grezes, 2004; Runeson and
Frykholm, 1983; Sartori et al., 2009, 2011). Two neural systems, the
mirror system and the mentalizing system have been shown to be active
when making inferences about the internal mental states of others from
their actions (Becchio et al., 2012; Ciaramidaro et al., 2014; de Lange
et al., 2008; Spunt et al., 2011; Spunt and Lieberman, 2012b).
The main components of the mentalizing system are considered to
be the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and the temporo-parietal
junction (TPJ; Frith and Frith, 2006; Schurz et al., 2014). The dorsal
sub-region of the mPFC (dmPFC), appears to be particularly involved in
inferring internal states of others from their actions (Amodio and Frith,
2006; Frith and Frith, 2006; Sallet et al., 2013). The orbitofrontal cortex
(OFC) is not considered a ‘core’ region of the mentalizing system but
neuroimaging and lesion studies have shown the involvement of this
region in mentalizing tasks (Mainieri et al., 2013; Stone et al., 1998;
Stuss, 2001). The OFC is therefore considered to be a region of the
extended mentalizing system (Gallagher and Frith, 2003). The core
components of the mirror system are the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and
the inferior parietal lobe (IPL; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti
and Sinigaglia, 2010). These regions show similar activation patterns
during both the performance and observation of actions (Rizzolatti
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et al., 1996) and it is thought that this pattern of activation reﬂects a
simulation of observed actions within the observer's own motor system
(Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004).
A variety of evidence suggest that interactions between the men-
talizing and mirror systems are important for mentalizing tasks invol-
ving action (Sperduti et al., 2014; Spunt and Lieberman, 2012b;
Ciaramidaro et al., 2014; Arioli et al., 2017). For example, functional
connectivity between the mentalizing and mirror systems has been
shown to be higher when inferring internal mental states based on vi-
deos of actions compared to text descriptions of actions (Spunt and
Lieberman, 2012b). It has been proposed that mentalizing tasks invol-
ving human action processing require increased connectivity in order to
allow kinematic information from the mirror system to be interpreted
by the mentalizing system (de Lange et al., 2008; Jacob and Jeannerod,
2005; Liew et al., 2011; Mainieri et al., 2013).
Individuals with autism spectrum condition (ASC) have diﬃculties
mentalizing (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Castelli et al., 2002; Jolliﬀe and
Baron-Cohen, 1999; Kana et al., 2014; Senju et al., 2009). The im-
pairment on mentalizing tasks in adults with ASC is particularly evident
in tasks involving action processing (Ponnet et al., 2004; Roeyers et al.,
2001; Rosenblau et al., 2015). This is important, because diﬃculties
inferring the social intentions of others (i.e. their intended impact on
others, such as the intent to help or to harm) can lead to inappropriate
social decisions, making them vulnerable to mistreatment (Fisher et al.,
2013; The National Autistic Society, 2014). The neural correlates of the
deﬁcit in mentalizing tasks involving action are not clear. However,
given the importance of interactions between the mirror and menta-
lizing systems on these tasks, it is possible that dysfunctional functional
connectivity between these systems could explain the diﬃculties ob-
served in ASC.
The aim of this fMRI study was: (1) to deﬁne regions in the men-
talizing and mirror systems that respond more to actions that involve
judging intention, (2) to measure functional connectivity between dif-
ferent regions of the mentalizing and mirror systems when inferring
social intentions from actions in typically developing individuals (TD)
and individuals with ASC. To address this issue, we recruited adults
with and without a diagnosis of ASC. Neural responses were recorded
using fMRI, while participants viewed videos in which actors performed
actions. In the experimental condition, participants had to judge whe-
ther the actions were spiteful or clumsy. We labelled this condition
‘mentalizing’ because it involves making a judgement of the intent of
the actor's movement. For example, in a spiteful trial, participants had
to judge whether the actor had deliberately decided not to perform the
task. They had to discriminate this from clumsy trials in which the
participant did not complete the task, but this was not done deliber-
ately. The actions in the videos were carefully matched and, in both
trial types, the outcome is the same. Our mentalizing task was based on
previous experiments that claim to measure the subjective state and
mental processes of others (Behne et al., 2005; Call et al., 2004). In the
control condition, participants were asked to indicate whether the ac-
tion was successful or unsuccessful. We labelled this condition ‘non-
mentalizing’ because it involves making a judgement of the outcome of
the actor's movement rather than the intent. That is, the success or
failure of the participant to post an object. Our non-mentalizing task is
similar to previous control conditions in mentalizing studies, in which
an action is viewed without requiring the participant to make an ex-
plicit judgement of mental state (Chambon et al., 2011; Chambon et al.,
2017a, 2017b; de Lange et al., 2008; Spunt et al., 2011; Xu et al., 2009).
The contrast between the mentalizing and non-mentalizing conditions
was used to deﬁne regions of the mentalizing and mirror systems that
are involved in making inferences about the intent of an action. This
comparison was complemented by a connectivity analysis in which we
asked whether there was an increase in functional connectivity between
these regions during the mentalizing task. Finally, we asked whether
there were diﬀerences in functional connectivity between individuals
with ASC and typically developing individuals, and asked whether
diﬀerences in connectivity can be predicted by the level of autistic
traits.
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
Twenty adults with a diagnosis of Asperger's or Autism Spectrum
Disorder (referred to collectively as Autism Spectrum Condition (ASC);
8 female) and twenty typically developing (TD) adults were recruited
for this study. Diagnoses were issued by qualiﬁed clinicians external to
this study and all participants in the ASC group met the DSM-5 criteria
for ASD. Participants in the ASC group were either recruited from the
University of York's student support services or a local support group.
Participants were individually matched across groups on both gender
and age and the groups did not signiﬁcantly diﬀer in years of formal
education (demographic information is shown in Table 1). One parti-
cipant from each group was left-handed. All participants had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision. This research project was approved by the
Ethics Committee at York Neuroimaging Centre and was performed in
accordance with the ethical standards laid down in the 1990 Declara-
tion of Helsinki. Six participants in the ASC group were taking psy-
chotropic medication to treat depression or anxiety and one of these
participants was additionally taking a very low dose of an antipsychotic
(see Table 2). None of the participants in the control group were taking
psychotropic medication for any psychiatric disorders.
2.2. Stimuli
The stimuli were action videos used in a previous behavioural study
(Cole et al., 2018), and the videos are described in detail there. Videos
were ﬁlmed at a resolution of 1080× 1920 pixels and 50 frames per
second. The videos showed actors either successfully or unsuccessfully
passing a poker chip through slots in a white wooden board to another
player on the other side that was out of view (Fig. 1). The actors in the
unsuccessful videos either did not pass the poker chip to the other
player deliberately (‘spiteful’ action) or accidentally (‘clumsy’ action).
All action types (successful, spiteful and clumsy) were carried out by
both pushing the poker chip (with the index ﬁnger) through a lower slot
or by grasping the poker chip (with the index ﬁnger and thumb) and
passing it through a higher slot. Eighteen diﬀerent actors (9 female)
were shown performing these actions and each video was four seconds
long.
Table 1
Participant demographic information; group mean (SD) values.
ASC TD p ηp
2
N 20 20
Age 29.8(12.87) 29.6 (13.50) 0.96 0.00
Gender (m:f) 12:8 12:8 1.00 (X2) /
Years of formal Education 16.20 (1.42) 17.20 (1.88) 0.07 0.09
p values were obtained from a one-way MANOVA unless otherwise stated.
Table 2
Medication information for participants in the ASC group.
Participant Medication (daily dosage)
1 Fluoxetine (20mg)
2 Mirtazapine (30mg)
3 Sertraline (200mg)
4 Sertraline (200mg)
5 Sertraline (200mg)
6 Aripiprazole (2.5mg), Citalopram (30mg)
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2.3. Experimental design
We used a block-design with two conditions: mentalizing and non-
mentalizing. In mentalizing blocks, participants were shown un-
successful (clumsy or spiteful) actions and after each video a response
screen, prompting participants to indicate whether the action was
clumsy or spiteful. In the non-mentalizing blocks, participants were
shown successful or unsuccessful (clumsy) actions and were asked to
indicate whether the action was successful or unsuccessful. In both
tasks, participants indicated their answers by pressing buttons on a
response box placed in their right hand. Each block contained six videos
(three of each type). Videos were counterbalanced, so that gender and
identity of the actors were not predictive of the actions they were
performing. These videos have been previously used in other experi-
ments (Cole and Barraclough, 2018; Cole et al., 2018a, 2018b).
At the beginning of each block, an instruction screen was shown for
nine seconds to make participants aware of the task they would be
completing during the upcoming block. After each video the response
screen was shown for ﬁve seconds and afterwards a central ﬁxation
cross was shown for one second before the next video in the block was
shown. Participants completed twelve blocks (six mentalizing and six
non-mentalizing) lasting a total of 12min 36 s. The videos were pro-
jected onto a rear projection screen in the bore of the scanner using an
Epson EB-G5900 projector with a long throw lens. Participants viewed
the videos using a mirror attached to the head coil. Videos were shown
full screen (subtending 40×23° of visual angle, 1920×1080 pixels).
Prior to scanning, participants completed practice trials (one men-
talizing and one non-mentalizing block) on a laptop outside of the
scanner in order to familiarise them with the structure of the task. The
actors shown in the practice blocks were not shown in the main ex-
periment to avoid previous experience with the actors inﬂuencing de-
cisions in the main experiment.
2.4. Psychological assessments
We used standardised psychological assessments to measure the
level of autistic traits displayed by all participants (both those with and
without a diagnosis of ASC). This was done so that behavioural and
neural measures could be investigated in relation to the level of autistic
traits displayed. This method complements the use of group diﬀerences
based on diagnosis because of the high variability in levels of autistic
traits known to exist within clinical and non-clinical populations
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013; Robinson et al., 2011; van
Boxtel and Lu, 2013; Von Dem Hagen et al., 2011). High variability in
autistic traits within groups could generate high variability in beha-
vioural and neural characteristics (Gökçen et al., 2014, 2016; van
Boxtel and Lu, 2013) and thus prevent group diﬀerences being identi-
ﬁed. Participants completed three psychological assessments after the
scanning session: two self-report questionnaires and one interactive
task. The questionnaires completed were the Autism Spectrum Quotient
(AQ) scale and the Social Responsiveness Scale (SRS-2). The interactive
task used was the Awareness of Social Inference Test (TASIT) which
involves watching video clips of social interactions and subsequently
answering questions about the thoughts and feelings of characters.
These psychological tests have been shown to display good psycho-
metric properties (Hurst et al., 2007; McDonald et al., 2006; Wigham
et al., 2012). The AQ, SRS-2 and TASIT scores were calculated and a
one-way MANOVA was used to identify group diﬀerences in these
scores. The scores on all psychological tests signiﬁcantly diﬀered be-
tween groups (see Table 3). In all cases, scores in the ASC group in-
dicated higher levels of autistic traits/greater degree of social impair-
ment.
Fig. 1. Images showing frames of example videos during the mentalizing and non-mentalizing tasks: A. Spiteful action, B. Successful action, C. Clumsy action. In all
videos the actor's hand started in the same stationary position (left panels), the poker chip was then grasped with the right hand (middle panels) before being either
(right panels) deliberately dropped (A), passed through the board to another player who is out of view (B) or accidentally dropped (C).
Table 3
Participants' psychological test scores; group mean (SD) values.
ASC TD p ηp
2
AQ 37.4 (8.04) 12.90 (6.23) < .001*** 0.75
TASITa 46.35 (10.92) 58.20 (4.26) < .001*** 0.35
SRSb 114.75 (26.37) 35.85 (20.90) < .001*** 0.74
p values were obtained from a one-way MANOVA.
a Obtained from part 3 (social inference test), scores are out of 64.
b Unstandardized, raw scores, where scores above 75 reﬂect severe social
impairment.
E.J. Cole et al. 1HXURSV\FKRORJLD²

A principal components analysis (PCA) was then performed on all
the psychological test scores in order to obtain a single score for each
participant that reﬂected the level of autistic traits that they displayed.
The psychological test scores correlated with each other (all rs> 0.6)
meaning that they were suitable for PCA. The Kasier-Meyer-Olkin
measure of sampling accuracy was above .6, Barlett's test of sphericity
was signiﬁcant χ2(3)= 100.03, p < .001 and the communalities were
all .7 or above; this collectively supported the inclusion of all the psy-
chological tests in the PCA. PCA with varimax rotation was used. Only
one factor had an eigenvalue above Kaiser's criterion of 1 (2.51) and
this factor explained 83.56% of the variance in psychological test
scores. Consequently, only one factor was extracted and this factor was
labelled ‘autistic traits’.
2.5. Behavioural analysis
The numbers of correct responses on the mentalizing and non-
mentalizing tasks were calculated for each participant (out of a total of
36). Data screening identiﬁed that the behavioural data were not nor-
mally distributed even after a log transformation had been applied so
independent t-tests with bootstrapping were used to investigate po-
tential group diﬀerences in behavioural performances. Linear regres-
sion analyses were used to investigate relationships between autistic
traits and performance on both tasks.
2.6. Data acquisition and analysis
A 3 T GE HD Excite MRI scanner with an 8-channel phase array head
coil tuned to 127.4MHz was used to acquire fMRI data. A gradient-echo
EPI sequence was used to collect data from 38 interleaved axial slices
(TR = 3 s, TE = 35ms, voxel size = 2.25× 2.25, ﬂip angle = 90o,
FOV = 288mm, matrix size = 128×128, slice thickness = 3mm).
High-resolution T1-weighted anatomical images (TR = 7.96ms, TE =
3.05ms, voxel size = 1.13× 1.13mm, FOV = 290mm, matrix size =
256×256, slice thickness = 1mm) were also obtained. T1-weighted
ﬂuid-attenuated inversion recovery sequence (T1-FLAIR) images with
the same spatial prescription as the EPI data were collected to aid co-
registration to structural images (voxel size = .56×.56mm, matrix
size = 512×512).
fMRI analyses were conducted using FEAT v5.98 (http://www.
fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl). The data were pre-processed with slice-timing
correction, spatial smoothing (FWHM: 6mm), motion correction
(MCFLIRT, FSL) and temporal high-pass ﬁltering. Brain extraction was
conducted using the FSL brain extraction tool (BET). The individual
data were then analysed using a general linear model (GLM) with two
regressors: ‘mentalizing’ and ‘non-mentalizing’. Parameter estimates
were calculated for each condition by regressing the hemodynamic
response against a box-car regressor showing the onset and oﬀset of
each video convolved with a gamma response function.
In order to identify areas that displayed higher levels of activation
during the mentalizing blocks compared to the non-mentalizing blocks,
statistical images were created for the mentalizing>non-mentalizing
contrast. Functional data for each participant were ﬁrst registered to
the participant's high-resolution T1-image (using the T1-FLAIR image
as an intermediate step to aid co-localisation) and then data were re-
gistered onto the standard MNI brain (ICBM152). Individual participant
data were entered into a higher-level analysis using a mixed-eﬀects
design (FLAME; http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk).
Regions of interest (ROIs) were deﬁned using the peak activations
for the mentalizing>non-mentalizing contrast. ROI masks were drawn
using fslview and fslmaths (http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl) commands
were used to restrain the masks to voxels which were active (z > 3.1)
for the mentalizing>non-mentalizing contrast. ROIs were labelled
based on regions identiﬁed in existing fMRI studies (Becchio et al.,
2012; Liew et al., 2011), meta-analyses (Schurz et al., 2014; Van
Overwalle and Baetens, 2009) and using the Juelich histological atlas
from the FSL anatomy toolboxes as a reference (Eickhoﬀ et al., 2005).
This process of deﬁning ROIs based on peak activation using our data
and conﬁrming the location of these ROIs using previously reported co-
ordinates is consistent with previous studies (Kana et al., 2009; Libero
et al., 2014; Sperduti et al., 2014; Spunt and Lieberman, 2012b). The
ROIs deﬁned included: bilateral inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), bilateral
inferior parietal lobe (IPL), bilateral temporoparietal junction (TPJ),
bilateral orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and dorsal medial prefrontal cortex
(dmPFC).
In each participant, the timecourse of activation was extracted from
each ROI for both mentalizing and non-mentalizing blocks.
Timecourses were based on the 6 blocks (6 min and 18 s) of data from
each task. Alternating block designs like ours have been shown to
produce equivalent functional connectivity results as continuous data
collection (Fair et al., 2007). The advantage of using alternating blocks
is that it limits the impact of factors such as participant inattention/
boredom, learning or repetition eﬀects inﬂuencing the data. Previous
fMRI studies investigating functional connectivity during mentalizing
tasks have used comparable alternating block designs (Ciaramidaro
et al., 2014; Damarla et al., 2010; Libero et al., 2014; Spunt and
Lieberman, 2012a, 2012b; Xu et al., 2009).
To measure functional connectivity between and within regions, we
correlated the time series from diﬀerent ROIs. Our aim was to de-
termine if there was greater connectivity during the mentalizing com-
pared to the non-mentalizing blocks. This comparison of connectivity
according to task is similar to PPI (O’Reilly et al., 2012) and has been
used in a number of previous fMRI studies (Damarla et al., 2010;
Fishman et al., 2014; Libero et al., 2014; Mason et al., 2008; Neufeld
et al., 2017; Von Dem Hagen et al., 2014). A mixed model ANOVA was
used to explore task and regional diﬀerences in connectivity both
within each system individually and between the mentalizing and
mirror systems, we performed mixed model ANOVAs. Prior to statistical
analysis, correlations were transformed using a Fisher's z transform.
3. Results
3.1. Behavioural performance
Performance on the mentalizing and non-mentalizing tasks was
measured during the fMRI scan. Individuals in the ASC group displayed
poorer performances (M = 31.25, SD = 4.96) on the mentalizing task
than the TD group (M = 33.65, SD = 2.30). This group diﬀerence in
behavioural performance on the mentalizing task (−2.4, BCa 95% CI
[−4.85, −.081]) was close to signiﬁcance (t(26.81)= −1.96, p=
.06). The diﬀerence in behavioural performance on the non-mentalizing
task (−1.15, BCa 95% CI [−2.90, .31]), between the ASC (M = 33.95,
SD = 3.47) and TD (M = 35.1, SD = 1.86) groups was not signiﬁcant
(t(38)= 1.31, p= .20). Using linear regression, scores on the menta-
lizing [M =32.45, SD = 4.0] and non-mentalizing [M = 34.53, SD =
2.81] tasks were examined to see how they related to the level of au-
tistic traits. The level of autistic traits predicted performance on the
mentalizing task [F(1,38) = 5.50, p= .02, R2 = 0.13, 95% CI [− 2.65,
− 0.20]; see Fig. 2A], but did not predict performance on the non-
mentalizing task [F(1,38) = 0.01, p= .94, R2< 0.001, 95% CI
[− 0.96, 0.89]; see Fig. 2B].
3.2. Neural responses during mentalizing and non-mentalizing tasks
A group analysis across all participants was performed on the re-
sponse to either the mentalizing or non-mentalizing tasks relative to
baseline. Similar patterns of activation were elicited in primary sensory
and motor regions of the brain during both mentalizing and non-men-
talizing tasks (see Fig. 3), indicating that our stimuli were well matched
across the experimental and control conditions on basic sensorimotor
properties. During both mentalizing and non-mentalizing tasks, activity
was evident in regions of visual (posterior occipital lobe, lateral
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occipital lobe, fusiform gyrus) and motor cortex (pre-central gyrus,
supplementary motor area), reﬂecting the visual and motor components
of the tasks. There was also activity in the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG),
inferior parietal lobe (IPL), temporoparietal junction (TPJ), superior
parietal lobe (SPL), and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), reﬂecting
regions that form the mentalizing and mirror systems (Van Overwalle
and Baetens, 2009). The coordinates of the peak activation are shown in
Table 4.
Next, we contrasted the brain responses during the mentalizing and
non-mentalizing tasks. Signiﬁcantly higher activation during the men-
talizing task was evident in regions associated with the mentalizing
system, including bilateral dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC),
TPJ and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC; Fig. 4A; Frith and Frith, 2006;
Schurz et al., 2014). Signiﬁcantly higher activation during the menta-
lizing task was also evident in regions associated with the mirror
system, including bilateral inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and inferior
parietal lobe (IPL; Fig. 4B; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti
and Sinigaglia, 2010). Higher activation during the non-mentalizing
task was found in the left primary somatosensory cortex and the cin-
gulate gyrus. The co-ordinates of peak activation for the menta-
lizing>non-mentalizing and non-mentalizing>mentalizing contrasts
are shown in Table 5.
3.3. Functional connectivity within the mentalizing system
We compared functional connectivity between regions of the men-
talizing system. For each participant, the time-course of responses in
each region of the mentalizing system (dmPFC, TPJ, OFC) was corre-
lated with the time-course of each of the other regions within the
mentalizing system. To determine whether connectivity during the
mentalizing task was higher than during the non-mentalizing task,
these correlations were calculated separately for each task. Table 6
shows the average connectivity within the mentalizing systems during
both the mentalizing and non-mentalizing tasks for each group.
Fig. 2. A) Relationship between the level of autistic traits of each individual and performance on the mentalizing task. B) Relationship between level of autistic traits
of each individual and performance on the non-mentalizing task. The curved lines represent 95% conﬁdence intervals.
Fig. 3. Whole-brain group analysis showing
regions that were active during the mentalizing
(red) and non-mentalizing (blue) tasks com-
pared to baseline. The overlap in activation is
shown in yellow. Both tasks elicited bilateral
activation in inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), sup-
plementary motor area (SMA), temporopar-
ietal junction (TPJ), fusiform gyrus (FG), lat-
eral occipital cortex (LOC), precentral gyrus
(preCG) and the superior parietal lobe (SPL).
Images thresholded at z > 3.1, p < 0.001.
MNI co-ordinates of images (x, y, z): −32, 6,
20.
Table 4
Peak areas of activation during the mentalizing and non-mentalizing tasks
compared to baseline.
Peak MNI co-ordinates
Anatomical region BA x y z z-value
EVC 18 −6 −82 −6 8.50
Left LOC 18 −22 −92 12 8.33
Right LOC 37 48 −70 −2 8.13
Left M1 6 −26 −10 52 8.13
Right M1 6 24 −8 54 6.62
Left ventral stream 18 −14 −76 −14 7.64
Right ventral stream 37 30 −52 −14 6.90
Left SPL 7 −34 −48 54 7.53
Right SPL 7 16 −66 58 6.71
Left SMA 6 −6 0 52 6.35
Right SMA 6 8 6 52 5.38
Left PCC 31 −14 −26 40 6.08
Right PCC 31 14 −28 42 4.03
Left IPL 40 −54 −28 36 5.92
Right IPL 40 54 −26 36 4.26
Right TPJ 39 62 −44 20 5.08
Left TPL 22 −44 −40 18 4.25
Left IFG 44/6 −54 4 28 5.03
Right IFG 44/6 −48 0 28 4.90
Abbreviations: EVC - early visual cortex, LOC - lateral occipital cortex, M1-
primary motor cortex, SPL - superior parietal lobe, SMA - supplementary motor
area, PCC - posterior cingulate cortex, IPL - inferior parietal lobe, TPJ - tem-
poroparietal junction, IFG - inferior frontal gyrus.
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Connectivity within the mentalizing system was investigated using a
mixed ANOVA with Task (mentalizing, non-mentalizing) and Connec-
tion (dmPFC-TPJ, dmPFC-OFC, TPJ-OFC) as within subject variables
and Group (TD, ASC) as the between subject variable.
There was a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of Connection [F(2,76) = 55.92,
p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.56]. This shows that functional connectivity diﬀers
between diﬀerent regions of the mentalizing system. However, there
was no eﬀect of Task [F(1,38) = 1.79, p= .19, ηp
2 = 0.05]. There was
also no eﬀect of Group [F(1,38) = 0.09, p= .77, ηp
2 = .002]. There
were also no other interactions between Connection, Task and Group
[Task × Connection interaction: F(2,76) = 1.20, p= .31, ηp
2 = 0.03;
Task × Group interaction: F(1,38) = 0.001, p= .97, Task ×
Connection × Group interaction: F(2,76) = 1.55, p= .22, ηp
2 = 0.04,
Task × Group interaction: F(2,76) = 1.73, p= .18, ηp
2 = 0.04].
3.4. Functional connectivity within the mirror system
Connectivity within the mirror system was investigated using a si-
milar ANOVA but without Connection as a factor as there was only one
connection (IFG-IPL). Connectivity within the mirror system was not
signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by Task [F(1,38) = .86, p= .36, ηp
2 = 0.02].
There was also no main eﬀect of Group [F(1,38) = 0.54, p= .47, ηp
2=
Fig. 4. A) Regions associated with the mirror
system which showed higher activity during
the mentalizing task compared to the non-
mentalizing task: bilateral inferior frontal
gyrus (IFG) and bilateral inferior parietal lobe
(IPL). MNI co-ordinates of images: − 50, 14,
24. B) Areas associated with the mentalizing
system which displayed higher activity during
the mentalizing task compared to the non-
mentalizing task: dorsal medial prefrontal
cortex (dmPFC), bilateral temporoparietal
junction (TPJ) and bilateral orbitofrontal
cortex (OFC). MNI co-ordinates of images: 6,
36, 4. Images are thresholded at z > 3.1,
p < 0.001. C) Mentalizing-induced changes in
functional connectivity between mentalizing
and mirror system regions shown in A and B.
Asterisks indicate signiﬁcant (p < .05) task-
related changes in functional connectivity.
Error bars indicate SEM.
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0.01] or any Task × Group interaction [F(2,76) = 2.29, p= .14, ηp
2 =
0.06].
3.5. Functional connectivity between the mentalizing and mirror systems
Finally, we asked whether there was a diﬀerence in functional
connectivity between the mirror and mentalizing systems. Fig. 4C shows
the measures of functional connectivity between each of the menta-
lizing and mirror system regions in TD and ASC adults. These diﬀer-
ences in functional connectivity were investigated using a mixed
ANOVA with Task (mentalizing, non-mentalizing), mentalizing system
region (dmPFC, TPJ, OFC) and mirror system region (IFG, IPL) as
within subject variables, and Group (TD, ASC) as a between subjects
variable.
There were signiﬁcant main eﬀects of Mentalizing system region [F
(1,38) = 17.50, p < .001, ηp
2 = .32] and mirror system region [F
(1,38) = 94.28, p < .001, ηp
2 = .71]. There was also an interaction
between mentalizing system region and mirror system region [F(2,76)
= 31.12, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.45]. This shows that regions of the men-
talizing system were more strongly connected to some regions of the
mirror system than to others. There was no main eﬀect of Task [F(1,38)
= 1.35, p= .25, ηp
2= 0.03] or Group [F(1,38) = 0.03, p= .86, ηp
2=
0.001]. However, there was a signiﬁcant interaction between menta-
lizing region × Task × Group [F(1,38) = 5.78, p < .01, ηp
2 = 0.13].
This shows that functional connectivity of diﬀerent regions in the
mentalizing system was signiﬁcantly dependent upon the task and the
diagnosis of the individual. This eﬀect was not dependent upon the
connectivity to a speciﬁc mirror system region [mentalizing system
region × Group × Task × mirror system region: F(2,76) = 1.01, p=
.37, ηp
2 = .03]. No other interactions were signiﬁcant [mentalizing
system region × Group: F(2,76) = 8.07, p= .45, ηp
2 = 0.02; menta-
lizing system region × Task: F(2,76) = 2.14, p= .13, ηp
2 = 0.05;
mirror system region × Group: F(2,76) = .70, p= .41, ηp
2 = 0.02;
mirror system region × Task: F(1,38) = 1.47, p= .23, ηp
2 = 0.04;
Group × Task: F(1,38) = .89, p= .35, ηp
2 = .02; mentalizing system
region × mirror system region × Group: F(2,76) = 5.78, p= 0.27, ηp
2
= .03; mentalizing system region × mirror system region × Task: F
(2,76) = 0.006, p= .99, ηp
2< 0.001; mirror system region × Group
× Task: F(1,38) = 0.65, p= .43, ηp
2 = 0.02].
The signiﬁcant 3-way interaction between Mentalizing system re-
gion × Task × Group was investigated further by comparing con-
nectivity across tasks for each group (TD, ASC) and mentalizing region
separately. As the signiﬁcant 3-way interaction was not dependent
upon the connected mirror system region, timecourse correlations were
averaged across mirror system regions. In the TD group, connectivity of
the dmPFC with the mirror system was signiﬁcantly higher during the
mentalizing task compared to the non-mentalizing task [t(19)= 2.78,
p= .01]. Connectivity of both TPJ and OFC with the mirror system did
not signiﬁcantly diﬀer across tasks [TPJ: t(19)= 0.11, p= .91, OFC: t
(19)= 1.10, p= .29]. The increased connectivity between dmPFC and
the mirror system survived correction for multiple comparisons
(Bonferroni corrected p value: .05/3= .017). For the ASC group, there
were no task-related diﬀerences in functional connectivity between
mentalizing regions (dmPFC, TPJ, OFC) and the mirror system [dmPFC:
t(19)= .04, p= .97, TPJ: t(19)= 1.15, p= .27, and OFC: t(19)=
−0.65, p= .53].
Finally, we asked whether functional connectivity between dmPFC
and mirror system regions is predicted by autistic traits. During the
mentalizing task, high levels of autistic traits signiﬁcantly predicted
decreases in connectivity between dmPFC and IFG [F(1,38) = 7.23,
p= .01, R2 = 0.16], but not between dmPFC and IPL [F(1,38) = 2.67,
p= .11, R2 = 0.07]. Autistic traits did not predict functional con-
nectivity between dmPFC and either region of the mirror system during
non-mentalizing tasks [dmPFC and IFG: F(1,38) = 0.04, p= .84, R2 =
0.001; dmPFC and IPL: F(1,38) = 0.14, p= .71, R2 = 0.004].
4. Discussion
This study aimed to identify whether functional connectivity be-
tween diﬀerent regions of the mirror and mentalizing systems is higher
when inferring the social intentions of others from their actions, and
whether functional connectivity between these systems is diﬀerent in
individuals with ASC. We found an increased neural response in regions
associated with the mentalizing and mirror systems when participants
were making inferences about the intent underlying an action (men-
talizing) compared to when they were viewing an action without an
explicit judgement of intent (non-mentalizing). We also found higher
levels of functional connectivity between the mentalizing system
(dmPFC) and the mirror system (IFG, IPL) in TD adults. However, the
functional connectivity between these regions did not increase during
the mentalizing task in adults with ASC. Across all participants, higher
levels of autistic traits signiﬁcantly predicted reduced functional con-
nectivity between dmPFC and IFG during the mentalizing task and a
reduced ability to infer social intentions.
Table 5
Areas of peak activation for the mentalizing>non-mentalizing contrast
(p < .001 uncorrected for multiple comparisons).
Peak MNI co-ordinates
Contrast Anatomical
region
BA x y z z-value
Mentalizing> non-mentalizing Right OFC 47 52 32 −8 5.72
Left OFC 47 −50 24 −4 5.60
Right SMA 6 6 18 56 4.71
Left SMA 6 −6 12 60 3.51
Right IFG 44 52 20 12 4.36
Left IFG 44 −52 14 20 3.79
Right TPJ 37 56 −52 10 4.19
Left TPJ 21 −52 −50 4 3.47
dmPFC 9 4 48 38 4.11
Right IPL 40 62 −42 24 3.53
Left IPL 39 −62 −46 28 3.54
Non-mentalizing>mentalizing CG 23 0 −42 36 4.65
Left S1 1 −52 −22 46 3.93
OFC - orbitofrontal cortex, SMA - supplementary motor area, IFG - inferior
frontal gyrus, TPJ - temporoparietal cortex, dmPFC - dorsomedial prefrontal
cortex, IPL - inferior parietal lobe, CG – cingulate gyrus, S1-primary somato-
sensory cortex.
Table 6
Average measures of connectivity (mean r value and SE in brackets) within mentalizing system and mirror systems during mentalizing and non-mentalizing tasks for
TD and ASC individuals.
Connection Mentalizing TD Non-mentalizing TD Mentalizing ASC Non-mentalizing ASC
Mentalizing system
dmPFC-TPJ 0.50 (.05) 0.47 (.03) 0.49 (.08) 0.48 (.06)
dmPFC-OFC 0.94 (.05) 0.91 (.05) 0.82 (.09) 0.83 (.08)
TPJ-OFC 0.59 (.05) 0.56 (.04) 0.66 (.05) 0.57 (.05)
Mirror system
IFG-IPL 0.48 (.05) 0.41 (.04) 0.48 (.05) 0.50 (.05)
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These results provide insights into the way that the mentalizing and
mirror systems interact during mentalizing tasks. Increased con-
nectivity between dmPFC and IFG has previously been shown when
inferring intentions from actions (Spunt and Lieberman, 2012b). To-
gether, these ﬁndings support the important role of the connectivity
between the dmPFC and the IFG when making inferences about the
internal mental states of others based on their actions. In contrast to TD
adults, adults with ASC did not show a similar increase in connectivity
between the mentalizing and mirror systems during the mentalizing
task. This diﬀerence in connectivity in adults with ASC is consistent
with the diﬃculties that they have inferring internal states from actions
(Kana et al., 2009; Kirkovski et al., 2016; Ponnet et al., 2004; Roeyers
et al., 2001; Rosenblau et al., 2015; Spek et al., 2010). Our results also
show that adults with higher levels of autistic traits showed reduced
abilities to infer the intentions of others from their actions, supporting
the ﬁndings of a previous behavioural study using this paradigm (Cole
et al., 2018b). Higher levels of autistic traits were also correlated with
reduced functional connectivity between dmPFC and IFG. This suggests
that, in adults with high levels of autistic traits, there is a disruption to
the functional connectivity between mentalizing and mirror systems
and a reduced ability to infer the intentions of others from their actions.
A key feature of our design was that the mentalizing task involved
making an inference about a person's intent (clumsy or spiteful),
whereas the non-mentalizing task just required making an observation
of the outcome (successful or unsuccessful). The outcome of the men-
talizing task was always failure, so outcome could not be used to per-
form the task. However, it is possible that the diﬀerence between
clumsy and spiteful trials could be discriminated by lower-level in-
formation in the actions rather than higher-level information about the
inference (Michael and De Bruin, 2015; Catmur, 2015; Herschbach,
2015). Although we cannot rule out this possibility, the contrast be-
tween the mentalizing and non-mentalizing conditions did not show
any diﬀerences in sensory regions, particularly those involved in action
perception.
It could be argued that successful observation of the videos in both
conditions could involve similar levels of mentalizing. For example,
higher-level inferences (e.g. reward/punishment) might be associated
with successful/unsuccessful judgements on the non-mentalizing task.
The reason for the diﬀerence in response between the mentalizing and
non-mentalizing conditions is that the response options in the menta-
lizing condition contain the word ‘spiteful’, which implies intent. In
contrast, the response options for the non-mentalizing condition con-
tain words that do not imply intent, or at least not to the same degree
(‘successful’, ‘unsuccessful’). Therefore, the diﬀerence between condi-
tions could reﬂect diﬀerential activity to the text when participants are
asked to make a response. The change in connectivity observed be-
tween the mentalizing and non-mentalizing conditions need not be
explained by the demands of mentalizing. Rather, they could be ex-
plained by sensorimotor learning – participants push a button in re-
sponse to a word that is associated with a mental state that implies
intent. One way to diﬀerentiate between these diﬀerent explanations is
to compare (in the absence of the video) the response to words that
imply intentional mental states (e.g. spiteful) with words that do not
imply intentional mental states or at least to a lesser extent (e.g. suc-
cessful) in the same regions. Although our data does not allow us to
make this comparison, previous studies have found a lack of mirror
system activation during mentalizing tasks using passages of text
(Gallagher et al., 2000; Schurz et al., 2014; White et al., 2014). More-
over, a previous study also found greater connectivity between the
dmPFC and IFG when inferring intent from videos compared to in-
ferring intent from passages of text (Spunt and Lieberman, 2012b).
It has been proposed that inferring the social intentions of others
from their actions requires the integration of contextual information
and action kinematics (Chambon et al., 2017a; de Lange et al., 2008;
Jacob and Jeannerod, 2005; Liew et al., 2011; Mainieri et al., 2013).
Existing fMRI studies have provided evidence that context and
expectations about an upcoming action are processed in the mPFC
(Alexander and Brown, 2011; Becchio et al., 2012; Chambon et al.,
2017a; Cooper et al., 2010; Fogelson et al., 2009; Forster and Brown,
2011). Activity in the IFG, on the other hand, has been associated with
processing intentional information portrayed by kinematic cues
(Becchio et al., 2012; Buccino et al., 2007; Ciaramidaro et al., 2014;
Herbet et al., 2014). Therefore, the reduced connectivity between the
dmPFC and IFG found in adults with ASC may result in a reduction in
the integration of kinematic and contextual information, leading to
diﬃculties inferring social intentions (de Lange et al., 2008; Keysers
and Gazzola, 2007; Spunt and Lieberman, 2012c; Uddin et al., 2007).
The idea that there is a reduced integration of action context and ki-
nematic information occurs in ASC is supported by a meta-analysis that
showed adults with ASC are signiﬁcantly impaired on mentalizing tasks
that involve integrating information regarding others’ internal states
with surrounding context (Baez et al., 2012). Behavioural studies have
also found atypical utilisation of prior experience relative to incoming
sensory information in adults with ASC when inferring social intentions
from actions (Chambon et al., 2017b) and children with ASC show
impaired abilities to infer intentions when this requires processing of
both contextual information and kinematic information (Boria et al.,
2009). These data imply that integration of prior expectations and in-
coming sensory information is atypical in ASC during action observa-
tion. This reduced integration may result from reduced functional
connectivity between IFG and dmPFC and consequently give rise to a
poorer ability to infer social intentions from actions.
Some evidence has suggested that reduced mirror system (Cole
et al., 2018a; Iacoboni and Dapretto, 2006; Oberman and
Ramachandran, 2007; Ramachandran and Oberman, 2006) or reduced
mentalizing system function (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; Happé et al.,
1996; Holt et al., 2014; Kana et al., 2009) underlies the social impair-
ments associated with ASC. We found no evidence of reduced activation
or functional connectivity within either the mirror or mentalizing sys-
tems. This is consistent with a number of previous studies that have also
reported typical mirror system activation (Kana et al., 2009; Kirkovski
et al., 2016; Marsh and Hamilton, 2011; Vander Wyk et al., 2014) or
typical mentalizing system activation (Ciaramidaro et al., 2015;
Kirkovski et al., 2016; Vander Wyk et al., 2014) in adults with ASC.
Behavioural studies have shown that adults with ASC do not display
consistent impairments on mentalizing tasks, which do not involve
observing human action (Ammons et al., 2018; Kana et al., 2009;
Kirkovski et al., 2016; Murdaugh et al., 2012; Ponnet et al., 2004;
Roeyers et al., 2001; Spek et al., 2010) and neuroimaging studies have
shown that the mirror system is not reliably activated during these tasks
(Castelli et al., 2000, 2002; Gallagher et al., 2000; White et al., 2014).
These data suggest that mentalizing system activation, without mirror
system involvement, is suﬃcient to perform mentalizing tasks that do
not involve human action (Castelli et al., 2000, 2002; Gallagher et al.,
2000; White et al., 2014). In contrast, both mirror system and menta-
lizing system activation are reliably found during mentalizing tasks
involving the observation of human actions (Becchio et al., 2012;
Ciaramidaro et al., 2014; de Lange et al., 2008; Hooker et al., 2010;
Spunt and Lieberman, 2012a, 2012b) and connectivity between these
cortical systems has been shown to increase during these tasks (Rudie
et al., 2012; Spunt and Lieberman, 2012a, 2012b; Tettamanti et al.,
2017). The observed behavioural deﬁcits in adults with ASC therefore
support our ﬁnding that functional connectivity between mentalizing
and mirror systems is reduced in individuals with ASC rather than
dysfunction in either system alone.
It was perhaps surprising that we did not observe an increase in
connectivity between the TPJ and the mirror system when deriving
intentions from actions. The right TPJ has been shown to be involved in
attributing thoughts to other individuals (Saxe and Powell, 2006).
However, increased functional connectivity between dmPFC and areas
of the mirror system has been more commonly reported when inferring
others internal states from their actions (Ciaramidaro et al., 2014;
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Spunt and Lieberman, 2012a, 2012b; Rudie et al., 2012) than increased
connectivity between TPJ and mirror system areas (Spunt and
Lieberman, 2012a). The TPJ is associated with self-referential proces-
sing (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Blanke, 2005; Molnar-Szakacs and
Uddin, 2013). It is possible that if a mentalizing task was used which
elicited greater self-referential processing then increased connectivity
may have been found between TPJ and mirror system areas.
In conclusion, increased connectivity between areas of the mirror
and mentalizing systems was found when inferring the intentions of
others from their actions in TD adults. This increased connectivity be-
tween the mirror and mentalizing systems was not evident in adults
with ASC. The level of autistic traits predicted behavioural performance
on mentalizing and the connectivity between the mirror and menta-
lizing regions. Our data highlight the possibility that reduced con-
nectivity between the mirror and mentalizing systems could underlie
diﬃculties adults with ASC experience in inferring social intentions.
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